Young children are often thought to confuse fantasy and reality. This study took a second look at preschoolers' fantasy/reality differentiation. We employed a new measure of fantasy/reality differentiation-a property attribution task-in which children were questioned regarding the properties of both real and fantastical entities. We also modified the standard forced-choice categorization task (into real/fantastical) to include a 'not sure' option, thus allowing children to express uncertainty. Finally, we assessed the relation between individual levels of fantasy orientation and fantasy/reality differentiation. Results suggest that children have a more developed appreciation of the boundary between fantasy and reality than is often supposed.
smaller body o f w o rk specifically ex ploring childre n's understan ding of the fantasy/ re ality distinc tion c onfirms Piaget's view that childre n o fte n fail to o bse rve the pro p er bo undary. Fo r ex ample, Taylor and How e ll (1973) pre sente d 3-to 5-year-o ld childre n w ith both fantastic al and natural p ic ture s of animals, and asked children to state w hether the de picte d sc enes could re ally happen. Thre e-year-olds had c onsiderable difficulty differe ntiating re al from fantastical sc e nes. Using a similar me thod, Samue ls and Taylor (1994) fo und that childre n w ere most c onfuse d w hen events w ere pe rc eive d as frighte ning. These findings imply a ro le fo r emo tion in young c hildre n's understanding o f re ality status and suggest that their grasp o f the fantasy/re ality distinc tion may be so me w hat fragile. In another study (Morison & Gardner, 1978) , a some w hat firme r grasp of the distinctio n eme rged in an older gro up o f childre n (kindergarte n thro ugh sixth grade), but pe rfo rmance c ontinued to impro ve thro ugho ut the grade scho ol years.
Empirical re searc h o n the fantasy/re ality distinc tion is thus co nsiste nt w ith Piaget's vie w that young c hildre n have difficulty negotiating the bo undary betw een fantasy and re ality. It is also co nsiste nt w ith surve y data show ing high le vels o f belief in spec ific fantasy e ntitie s such as Santa Claus and the Easte r Bunny (Clark, 1995; Pre ntice , Mano se vitz, & Hubbs, 1978 ; Rosengre n, Kalish, Hickling, & Ge lman, 1994) . It seems c le ar that childre n have stro ng leve ls of be lie f in entities that to adults are unambiguously fantastic al.
These various so urc es thus pre se nt a so me w hat inc onsiste nt picture of young childre n's understanding of differe nt non-re ality/re ality c ontrasts. To begin to make se n se o f the se findings, w e ta ke a s e c o nd lo o k at c hildre n's fantasy/ re ality differe ntiation. Our me thods w ere guided in part by the belief that the cate gorizatio n tasks use d in pre vious re searc h may give an overly simplistic re ading of childre n's understanding, lending their re spo nse s an appearance o f o nto logical commitme nt no t actually felt by them. We w ere also guided by the finding that c hildren o ften re veal greate r c ate gory unde rstanding w he n the ir know le dge is asse sse d via inductio n tasks that te st their ability to make app ro priate infe re nc es (e .g. Ge lman & Markman, 1987) . In a typ ic al inductio n task, childre n are taught a no vel p ro pe rty fo r an o bje ct and then are te ste d for the cate go rical range ove r w hich they are w illing to generalize that pro p erty. This me thod has pro ven ex tre me ly pro duc tive in re vealing the depth and complex ity o f childre n's early c onc epts (e.g. Ge lman, 1989; Kalish & Ge lman, 1992; Lo pez, Ge lman, Gutheil, & Smith, 1992; Mandler & Mc Do nough, 1996) . Give n this, it is p ossible that childre n w ho fail to label entities acco rding to adult cate gorie s of re al and pre te nd may still re c ognize differe nc es be tw ee n re al and fantastical entitie s in te rms o f the ir abilities and pro pe rtie s. This possibility has no t pre viously be en te ste d.
Prior w o rk do es ho w ever suggest that at least part of the nece ssary know ledge is in place. Spec ifically, re searc h has show n that yo ung c hildre n have clear ideas abo ut the kinds of things re al e ntities can and c annot do . By four o r five years o f age, they can ide ntify and differe ntiate re al entitie s o n the basis of the ir physical, p syc ho logical and biolo gical pro pertie s (We llman & Ge lman, 1998) . For ex amp le , childre n of this age kno w that living things occ upy space, have thoughts and gro w . At the same time , many fantasy figure s posse ss c le ar no n-human abilities, suc h as the ability to travel great distance s instantaneously. Childre n may thus ap pre ciate that these pro p ertie s are unusual and-more impo rtantly-non-human, before they ap pre ciate that the entities that po ssess them are nece ssarily fantastical. In other w o rds, young childre n may demo nstrate more acc urate fantasy/ re ality differe ntiation in the p ro p ertie s they attribute to various entities than in the c ate gories to w hich the y assign them.
The first goal o f the pre se nt study w as to ex plo re this possibility. Spe cifically, w e inve stigate d the number and kinds o f pro p ertie s childre n and adults attribute d to a range o f re al and fantastic al entities. Pro pe rtie s from four fo undational domains w ere include d (physical, bio logical, so cial and me ntal), be cause pre vious re searc h has show n that children's kno w ledge de velo ps at differe nt rate s in these do mains, w ith physical and so c ial kno w ledge de velop ing before know le dge of biolo gy o r me ntal state s (e.g. Care y, 1996; Hirshfield & Ge lman, 1994) . Adult pro perty attributio ns w ere also asse sse d in order to (1) c onfirm that adults discriminate in the ir pro p erty attributions for re al and fantastical entities, and (2) establish the adult patte rn of attributions acro ss do mains.
A sec ond goal w as to obtain a mo re nuance d p icture of yo ung c hildre n's cate go rizatio n o f re al and fantastic al entities. As in pre vious studies, w e had c hildre n cate go rize a variety o f e ntitie s. How e ver, inste ad o f having childre n simp ly cate gorize entities as 're al' o r 'pre te nd', w e inc luded a third 'no t sure ' o ption to capture unce rtainties, w hic h arguably c ould be ve ry pre valent in this domain yet w o uld not be capture d in the traditio nal so rt.
The third go al o f this study w as to investigate the po te ntial ro le of individual differe nc es in c hildren's fantasy/ re ality differe ntiatio n. Oddly, the ro le of individual differe nc es in fantasy/ re ality differe ntiation is rare ly addressed (cf. Bourc hier & Davis, 2000; Johnso n & Harris, 1994; Wo olley, 1997) . Some c hildren are much mo re incline d than others to engage in fantastic al p ursuits, such as p re te nding or having an imaginary co mpanion (Taylo r, 1999) . Suc h a high fantasy o rientatio n (FO) could have great po te ntial re levance to c hildre n's be lie fs in fantastical figure s. On the one hand, a high FO co uld inc re ase belief in fantastical entities. FO and a w illingness to belie ve in the ex iste nc e of e ntitie s for w hich the re is little empirical suppo rt have often bee n co njo ined (Singe r & Singer, 1990; Vyse, 1997) . On the other hand, it is no t nec essarily the case that some o ne w ho enjo ys and engages in fantasy frequently is also some one w ho is confused abo ut w he re to draw the bo undary. In fact, just the o ppo site may be true . A child w ho e ngages in fantasy a great de al may develop a mo re highly tune d se nse of w hat is re al and w hat is no t pre cisely bec ause of his o r her play.
It is also p ossible that fantasy o rientatio n and understanding o f the fantasy/ re ality distinctio n are unre lated. Data have be en sp arse and co ntradicto ry, w ith so me re searc he rs finding a p ositive re lation (Singe r & Singe r, 1981) and others finding no re lation (Dierker & Sanders, 1996 Pre ntice e t a l. 1978; Taylor, Cartw right, & Carlso n, 1993) . One re ce nt study aimed spec ifically at this que stio n (Bouldin & Pratt, 2001) found that childre n w ith an imaginary comp anio n w ere mo re likely than c hildren w ithout such a companio n to ente rtain the p ossibility that a briefly p re se nte d image w as a monste r. Ho w ever, a substantial pro po rtio n of childre n w ithout imaginary co mpanions also co nsidere d this po ssibility, leading the autho rs to suggest that it is individual differe nce s in cre dulity, rathe r than fantasy orie ntatio n per se, that leads to fantasy/ re ality co nfusio n. Rese arc h is c omplic ate d by the fac t that, at pre se nt, there ex ists no single , validate d sc ale o f fantasy o rientatio n. To enable an initial ex plo ratio n of the issue in the c urre nt study, a range o f fantasy orientation tasks w e re included.
To summarize, the go als of the curre nt study w ere (1) to dete rmine w hether c hildren differe ntiate betw ee n re al and fantastic al entities in the pro p ertie s they attribute to them, (2) to p ro be childre n's cate gorizatio n of a range o f re al and fantastic al e ntitie s, and (3) to ex plore the influence o f gene ral fantasy o rientatio n o n c hildre n's fantasy/ re ality differe ntiatio n. Although there are indications in the literature that verbal and behavio ural me asure s can re ve al differe nt levels of understanding o f the fantasy/ re ality distinctio n (e.g. Harris, Bro w n, Marrio tt, Whittall, & Harme r, 1991; Subbo tsky, 1997; Wo olley & Phelps, 1994), including both types o f me asure s w o uld have made o ur already le ngthy study ex cessive ly pro lo nged. We there fo re cho se to use o nly verbal me asures, to facilitate comparison betw een o ur re sults and re sults o f tho se studie s most clo se ly re late d to o urs (Mo rison & Gardner, 1978; Samue ls & Taylo r, 1994; Taylor & How e ll, 1973) .
Method

Participants
Six ty-four pre sc hoo lers w ere te ste d, including tw enty-tw o 3-ye ar-o lds (6 male and 12 female, M = 40 months, range 33-47), nine te e n 4-year-olds (10 male and 9 female, M = 51 months, range 48-58) and tw enty-thre e 5-year-olds (13 male s and 10 female s, M = 62 mo nths, range 60-68). Responses from thre e p artic ipants w e re o mitte d, o ne due to unc oo perative ne ss (a 4-year-o ld bo y) and tw o because of 'ye s' biase s (tw o 3-ye ar-o ld bo ys). Mo st childre n atte nded a c hildcare cente r affiliate d w ith a large unive rsity. Informe d conse nt w as o btained fro m all pare nts. Adult partic ipants w ere 38 adults enro lled in an intro ducto ry psyc hology course and 27 additional adults atte nding the same university.
Procedure
Childre n w e re te ste d individually by o ne o f thre e female ex pe rimente rs in tw o separate 25-min sessions. Se ssio ns w ere sp ac e d 1-15 days apart (M = 5 days). Te sting invo lved thre e tasks and an inte rview assessing the c hild's le vel o f fantasy o rientatio n. The tasks w e re a pro pertie s task, a cate gorizatio n task, and 3 min of fre e play w ith blo cks. In the first se ssion, childre n co mplete d half o f the pro p ertie s task (3 entities), the blo cks task and the FO inte rview . In the se c ond se ssion, childre n co mplete d the seco nd half of the pro pertie s task (3 entities), the FO inte rview again and the cate go rization task. The FO inte rview w as c omp le te d tw ice to pro vide a mo re ac curate asse ssment of childre n's fantasy orie ntatio n.
Properties task
Childre n w e re pre sente d w ith c oloure d line draw ings of vario us entities. Pre vious re se arc h has suggeste d that childre n re spo nd to , and re ason differe ntly about, generic fantastic al entities (such as mo nste rs and ghosts) co mpare d w ith sp ecific entitie s associate d w ith ce rtain eve nts (suc h as Santa; Rosengren e t a l., 1994; Sobe l & Lillard, 2001) . Ac co rdingly, children w ere p re se nte d w ith six e ntitie s: 2 re al entities, o ne specific (Mic hael Jordan) and o ne gene ric (a c hild of the same sex as the subjec t), 2 specific event-re lated fantastical e ntitie s (Easte r Bunny and Santa Claus), and 2 generic fantastic al e ntitie s (a monste r and a fairy). Eac h picture w as pre se nte d individually, and childre n's re c ognitio n of the e ntity w as asc ertaine d. Reco gnition w as unive rsal w ith the ex c eptio n of Michae l Jo rdan, for w ho m re co gnition w as lo w e r (53, 50 and 90%for 3-, 4-and 5-year-olds, re spectively). Childre n w ho did not re co gnize Jordan w ere pro vided a brief de sc rip tion ('Michae l Jordan is a famous baske tball player. He is very fast and stro ng').
For each entity, a se rie s o f 12 yes/no questio ns w ere aske d re garding w hether the entity posse sse d spe cific pro pertie s. There w ere thre e questions in each o f four do mains: physical, bio lo gic al, soc ial and me ntal (se e Ap pendix ) Questio ns w e re de signed to tap a bro ad range of pro pertie s, including both tho se that are nece ssarily true o f humans (e .g. biological p ro pe rtie s suc h as sleeping) and those that are no t ne cessarily true but highly characte ristic o f humans as childre n know them (e.g. so c ial pro pertie s suc h as eating dinner w ith one's family). The o rde r o f questio ns w as fixe d. The order o f entities w as partially counte rbalance d via e ight differe nt o rde rs o f pre sentatio n aro und the c onstra int that o ne re al entity be pre se nte d in each session.
Categorization task
Children w ere show n thre e trays o f differe nt c olours. The ex pe rime nte r ex plained that one tray w as fo r 're al ones', one w as for 'pre te nd one s', and one w as for 'one s you're no t sure about, o r you don't kno w '. The 'not sure ' tray w as alw ays in the centre ; plac eme nt of the o ther tw o trays w as c ounte rbalanced. Ne x t, children w ere show n individual picture s of entities pre se nte d in a random order w ith the que stio n 'Who is this?' for spe cific figure s (e.g. Santa) o r 'What is this?' for gene ric o nes (e.g. a mo nste r). They w ere then asked, 'Where do es this o ne go ?'. Bec ause this task w as much less timeinte nsive than the pro p ertie s task, w e w ere able to add more entities: tw o re latively familiar figures (a clow n and a magic ian), tw o le ss familiar figure s (a knight and Ro bin Hoo d) and a c omic -bo o k figure (Supe rman). Also include d w e re tw o ro ughly co mparable no n-human e ntities, o ne fantastical (dragon) and one re al (dinosaur). Rec ognition o f the additional e ntitie s w as ge nerally very high. 
Fantasy orientation assessment
The Fantasy Orie ntatio n asse ssment inc luded fo ur separate me asure s of fantasy orie ntation use d in p re vio us re searc h: a thre e-p art inte rview , and 3 min of free p lay w ith blo cks.
2 It included Taylor and Carlso n's (1997) Impersonation Inte rvie w , a shorte ned versio n of their Imaginary Companio n (IC) Inte rview and a subse t o f questio ns draw n from Singer's IPP (Imaginative Play Pre dispo sitio n) scale (Singe r, 1973; Singer & Singe r, 1981) . In a large study utilizing 20 differe nt pote ntial me asure s o f fantasy orientation (Taylor & Carlso n, 1997), Singe r's IPP lo aded significantly and he avily o n a 'fantasy e ngagemnnent' fac to r. Me asure s of the c hild's po ssessio n of an imaginary co mpanion and the ir imperso nation be haviour also loade d highly and significantly.
The te sting situation at the pre sc hoo l pre cluded re cruiting pare ntal input o n the FO me asure s, w hich can be a helpful w ay o f c ro ss-validating c hildre n's re spo nse s. In lie u o f this, w e administe re d eac h of the inte rvie w FO me asure s tw ice, once in each se ssio n; sc ore s fro m bo th se ssio ns w e re the n summe d. In this w ay, childre n w ho w ere mo re co nsiste nt in their fantasy orie ntatio n (w ho gave fantastical re sponse s both time s) ac hieve d a highe r sc ore on the individual measure than childre n w ho w e re less co nsiste nt (giving so me fantastical and so me no n-fantastical re sponse s). Childre n w ho gave co nsiste ntly no n-fantastic al re sponse s score d the low est.
The Impe rso natio n Inte rview (Taylor & Carlso n, 1997) co nsiste d of thre e questions asking w hether childre n e ver pre te nded to be (a) an animal, (b) a differe nt person, and (c) anything else (suc h as an airplane). Children w ere given one point for each 'yes' answ er for w hich they c ould also give at le ast o ne ex ample; thus, score s after bo th sessio ns co uld and did range fro m 0 to 6 (M = 3.15).
In the Imaginary Co mpanion Inte rview , the te rm 'pre te nd friend' w as first ex plained, and c hildre n w ere asked w hether they had a 'pre te nd friend'. For childre n w ho answ ere d ye s, a series o f nine fo llow -up questions w ere asked co nce rning issues such as the frie nd's name and ge nde r; w here the IC lives and sle eps; and w hether the IC w as a to y o r to tally pre te nd. The fo llow -up que stio ns allow ed us to e valuate the substantiveness o f po sitive re sp onse s. 'Yes' re spo nse s that clearly re ferre d to a sp ecific re al c hild (e.g. a co usin) o r pe t, o r for w hich no details c ould be p ro vided, w ere score d as 0. Ne gative re sponse s at both sessions w ere sc ore d 0. A single substantiate d positive re spo nse w as co de d 1; substantiate d, po sitive re sponse s at both sessions w e re score d 2. The modal re sponse on this me asure w as 0; almo st 60% o f c hildre n did not re po rt an imaginary co mpanion, w hile 40% did. This pro p ortio n is comp arable w ith pre vious re se arc h (Taylo r & Carlson, 1997).
Four que stio ns fro m Singer's (1973; Singer & Singer, 1981 ) IPP scale w ere use d, re garding c hildren's favourite game and favourite to y, w hether they like to talk to themselves in bed at night and w hat they think abo ut before they go to sleep . Re spo nse s w ere co ded, fo llow ing Singe r's (1973) guidelines, as either fantasy-orie nte d (e.g. monste r game ), w hich re c eived a sc o re o f 1, o r re ality-orie nte d (e.g. checkers), w hich re ce ived a sc o re of 0. Re spo nse s that suggeste d an imaginative co nte nt w ithout a cle ar fantasy element (e .g., playing fireman) w ere co ded 0.5. Sc ore s on this me asure after both se ssions co uld range fro m 0 to 8. Actual obtained sc o re s range d from 0 to 6 (M = 2.68).
Reliability of FO measures
One e x perime nte r sco re d all pro to co ls. A differe nt ex pe rime nte r re -score d 45% o f the p ro to c o ls. The inte r-rate r agre e me nt w as 93-98% fo r the 3 questio ns in the Impe rso natio n Inte rview ; 93% fo r the Imaginary Comp anio n inte rvie w ; and 78 to 89% for the 4 questions in Singer's IPP. Individual childre n's re spo nses to the FO inte rview me asure s ac ro ss the tw o se ssions w ere also assesse d and found to be largely co nsiste nt. Agree me nt for the 3 questions in the Impersonation Inte rview ranged from 73 to 79%; for the Imaginary Co mpanion inte rvie w , the figure w as 82%; and fo r the 4 questions in Singer's IPP, agree me nt ranged fro m 74 to 85% ex cep t for the 'sle ep' question, fo r w hich agree me nt w as 63%.
Testing of adults
The pro pertie s task w as administe re d to 38 adults as a simple fo ur-page questionnaire that to o k ap pro x imate ly 10 min to c omple te . Although w e fe lt co nfident that adults w o uld agree w ith o ur intuitions about the re ality status of the entities (e .g. that Michael Jordan is re al and that Santa Claus is no t), w e confirme d o ur intuitio ns on a separate sample o f 27 adults. The se adults w e re given a list of the entities and aske d to c hec k w hether the y w ere re al o r not (o r w he the r they w e re unsure ). For the 11 e ntitie s used in the final analysis, the judgments of these adults confirmed o ur intuitions 97% o f the time (288 out o f 297 judgments).
Results
FO measures
Bec ause one o f the me asures of fantasy orientation w as cate go rical rathe r than co ntinuo us, the re lations betw ee n the me asure s w ere asse sse d by a no n-parame tric me asure o f co rre lation, Spe arman's rank corre latio n co efficient. Results sho w ed a significant re lation betw e en Taylo r and Carlson's Imp erso nation Inte rview and both Singer's IPP Inte rview ( = .304, p < .05) and the IC Inte rvie w ( = .324, p < .05). There w as also a marginally significant re lationship betw een the latte r tw o me asure s, = .217, p = .09. Ac co rdingly, the se thre e me asure s w ere c ombine d to cre ate an overall FO sc ore . To co rre ct fo r the differe nt sc ales o n the differe nt me asure s, sc ore s w ere first co nve rte d to z sco re s and then summed. The re sulting sc ale had a me an of 0.28 and ranged betw een 4.09 and 3.98. Inspec tion o f the distributio n of sc ore s show ed a bre ak just below the me dian sc o re . Thus, c hildre n w ho sc o re d be lo w the me dian w e re classifie d as low FO (n = 29) and children at or abo ve it as high FO (n = 32). The distribution of high and lo w FO did not differ significantly ac ro ss the age gro ups, 2 (2) = 1.97, p = .37, nor by gender 2 (1) = .85, p = .39.
Categorization of the entities
Pre liminary analyses sho w ed no main effe cts or inte rac tions involving o rde r o r ge nder; these variable s w ere dro ppe d fro m subse quent analyse s. The first se t o f analyse s inve stigate d childre n's fantasy/re ality differe ntiation as me asure d in their cate go rization of the vario us entities. Consiste nt w ith pre vious re searc h, childre n performed po orly. Few e r than half (46%) of the ir to tal cate go ry judgme nts w ere co rre ct. A 3 (age) 2 (FO) 2 (entity typ e) mix ed analysis o f varianc e w as c onducte d on the p ro po rtio n o f co rre ctly cate go rized e ntities, w ith age and FO as be tw e en-subjec ts variables and entity type as the w ithin-subjects variable.
3 Results sho w ed a main e ffect of FO (1, 51) = 6.38, p < .05. Childre n w ith a high FO w ere more accurate in their cate gory judgments than w ere low FO childre n (54 vs. 40%).
There w ere also main e ffects o f age, F(2, 51) = 8.74, p < .001, and e ntity type, F(2, 51) = 10.54, p < .001, qualified by a significant inte rac tion be tw e en them, F(2, 51) = 10.54, p < .0005. Inspection of the me ans sho w ed that corre ct cate go rizatio n of the re al entities inc re ase d w ith age (M = 33, 60 and 74% fo r 3-, 4-and 5-year-o lds, re spective ly), w hile c orre ct c ate gorizatio n of the fantastic al e ntitie s show e d no impro veme nt (M = 34, 39 and 39%; Se e Fig. 1) . Thus, all age gro ups p erforme d at c hance levels in c ate gorizing the fantastic al entities, and 3-ye ar-o lds w ere e qually po or at cate go rizing the re al entities. The po or sc o re s o f 3-year-olds canno t be attribute d so lely to the ir lack o f familiarity w ith Jordan, as the same p atte rn w as o btained w ith the Mic hae l Jo rdan ite m ex cluded. Ho w ever, inspe ctio n of childre n's patte rns o f re sponse to individual e ntitie s (disc usse d sho rtly) sho w s that, rather than be ing rando m, the ir p o o r o ve rall performance re flec te d the fact that so me fantastic al entities w e re syste matically judged as fantastic al, w here as others w ere syste matically judged as re al.
Children's use of 'not sure'
Before ex amining these data, w e re moved the entities that childre n had difficulty re cognizing (Mic hae l Jordan and the knight). This w as do ne to e nsure that childre n's use of the 'not sure ' op tion re fle cte d uncertainty re garding the se e ntitie s' fantasy/ re ality status rather than the ir identity. We fo und that children use d the 'no t sure' o ptio n ex te nsively. Virtually all e ntitie s w ere assigned to this cate gory by at le ast some children at each age , and use frequently range d over 30%. Ove rall, ac ro ss the age gro ups and entities, 21% o f assignments w e re to the 'not sure ' box . These findings thus re veal an impo rtant eleme nt o f unc ertainty in childre n's fantasy/ re ality judgments.
Category judgments for individual entities
Among 3-year-olds, the o nly e ntity for w ho m childre n's patte rn o f re sponse s differe d significantly fro m a chanc e le vel of 33%, as me asure d by Pe arso n chi-square te sts, w as the knight (Table 1) . Furth er, their c onsensus o pinion w as inc orre ct. Fo ur-year-olds' cate go ry cho ices w ere more c onsiste nt. Among the re al entities, re sponse s fo r the child, c low n and Michael Jo rdan w ere all syste matic ally differe nt fro m chance (p < .01), w ith the majo rity co rre c tly assigning re al status. Thus, 4-year-olds de monstra te d a clear understanding of the re ality status o f both specific and gene ric human figure s. Among fantasy figure s, cate gorization choice s fo r Supe rman and Santa w ere significantly differe nt from chanc e (p < .05), w ith the majority o f childre n corre ctly c ate go rizing Supe rman as pre te nd but inco rre c tly cate go rizing Santa as re al.
By five ye ars of age , childre n made syste matic, if some time s erro neo us, c ate gory judgments fo r all but tw o entities (fairy and dragon). The majo rity o f this age group co rre c tly cate go rized all of the re al entities as re al and the monste r and Supe rman as pre te nd (p < .05). Ho w eve r, the majority also incorre ctly c ate gorized the tw o eve ntre late d fantastical entities-the Easte r Bunny and Santa-as re al (p < .001.)
Property attributions
The seco nd set o f analyses c oncerned the attributio n o f various pro pe rtie s to the differe nt e ntitie s. The most basic question w as w he the r childre n w o uld show any discrimination in their p ro pe rty attributio ns base d o n their o w n notions o f w hat w as Patterns of responding that are significantly different from chance by a chi-square test are indicated: < .10; * < .05, ** < .01; *** < .001.
re al or fantastical. To pro vide the c le are st p ic ture po ssible, entities cate gorize d as 'uncertain' w e re not included in this analysis. Average attribution sc ore s in e ac h o f the four domains w e re calculated for e ac h child base d on his or he r ow n cate gory judgments of 're al' and 'fantastic al'. Eight se p arate sc o re s re sulted, e ac h o f w hic h co uld range from 0 to 3 (e .g. ave rage attributio n o f so cial pro p ertie s fo r e ntitie s judge d re al, average attribution o f biological pro pertie s fo r e ntitie s judged fantastic al, etc .). As childre n assigned differe nt numbers of entitie s to eac h cate gory, score s w ere calc ulate d as average pro portio ns rathe r than ave rage raw sco re s. Sco re s w ere ente re d into a 3 (age ) 2 (FO) 2 (entity classific atio n) 4 (pro perty typ e) mix ed ANOVA. Re sults show ed only a main e ffect o f attributions, F(1, 45) = 8.9, p < .01. Childre n grante d more human-like pro p ertie s o f eve ry type to e ntitie s the y classified as re al than to those they classified as fantastic al; ho w ever, po st-hoc Sc heffé te sts show e d that the only significant differe nce w as in the soc ial do main (71%vs. 50%). This suggests that childre n's infere nces abo ut the so cial p ro pe rtie s of an entity may play a leading ro le in their judgments about the e ntity's re ality status.
The ne x t ste p w as to e xamine c hildren's pro perty attributions to entities as de fine d by the adult cate go rie s o f re al and fantastic al. The adult data w e re analyse d first to establish the adult patte rn o f attribution, fo llow ed by analyses of the children's data that also to o k into acco unt their age and fantasy orientation.
A re pe ate d-measure s ANOVA o n adult's attributions by pro perty and entity type pro duc ed a significant main effec t of attributions, F(37, 259) = 124.08, p < .0001. Posthoc Sc heffé te sts sho w ed that adults endo rse d significantly more pro pertie s o f e very typ e for re al entities co mpare d w ith fantastical entities (all p < .0001) (see Fig. 2A ). In addition, adults did no t discriminate in the types of human-like pro pertie s they attribute d to re al entities; the y w e re all e ndo rse d at equally high le vels. Ho w ever, adults did differe ntiate in the ir patte rn of attributio n for fantastic al entities: Human-like so c ial pro pertie s w ere attribute d significantly le ss o ften to fantastical entities than any other typ e o f pro pe rty (p < .05). Attribution o f the other types of pro pertie s to fantastical entities w as co mparable .
To asse ss children's patte rns o f attribution by pro perty and e ntity typ e, 4 a 3 (Age) 2 (FO) 2 (entity typ e) 4 (pro perty typ e) mix ed ANOVA w as conducte d, re vealing main effe cts of age , F(2, 55) = 5.95, p < .005, and FO, F(1, 55) = 10.56, p < .005. Thre eyear-o lds attributed fe w er pro pertie s o n average than did 4-or 5-ye ar-o lds (M = 1.7, 2.0, 2.1 o ut of 3, re sp ectively, p < .005), and high FO childre n attribute d more pro pertie s (M = 2.0) than did low FO childre n (M = 1.8). There w as also a significant main effe ct o f attributio ns, F(7, 385) = 46.78, p < .0001, qualified by a significant age -by-attributio n inte ractio n, F(14,385) = 4.32, p < .0001.
To de te rmine the cause of the age by attributio n inte ractio n, post-hoc Scheffé te sts w e re c onducte d on the patte rn of attributio ns se p arate ly fo r each age. The re sults (see Fig. 2B-D) re ve aled that the 5-year-olds c lose ly matc he d the adult patte rn o f attributio ns: Among 5-year-olds, re al entities w e re attribute d more human-like p ro pe rtie s of each type than w ere fantastic al entities, p < .0001, w hile attributio ns of the differe nt types of pro pertie s w ithin each entity type did not differ. Fo ur-year-olds show ed a similar patte rn, altho ugh their differe ntiatio n betw ee n re al and fantastic al entities w as not as co mplete : The y acco rde d significantly more human-like so cial (M = 2.6) and p hysical pro pertie s (M = 2.4) to re al entities c omp are d w ith fantastic al entities (M = 1.5 and 1.3, p < .005) but did not discriminate significantly betw een re al and fantastical entities in their attributio ns of me ntal pro pertie s. They sho w ed a no nsignificant tre nd to w ards differe ntiating in the bio lo gic al do main (M = 2.4 and 1.7), p = .08. In co ntrast, 3-ye ar-o lds show ed no syste matic differe ntiation by pro perty type, attributing re al and fantastic al e ntities ro ughly equivale nt numbe rs o f p ro pe rtie s o f e ac h type .
Finally, there w as also a significant thre e-w ay inte ractio n betw ee n age, FO and attributio ns, F(14, 343) = 1.81, p < .05. Inspec ting c hildre n's me an attributio ns suggeste d tw o so urc e s o f this inte ractio n. First, high-FO 3-year-o lds w ere re latively enthusiastic in the ir endorse me nt of social pro pertie s for fantastical entities co mpare d w ith the other groups, (M's = 2.4 vs. 1.4-1.7). Seco nd, 4-ye ar-o lds' attributions o f human-like pro pe rtie s to re al e ntitie s re ve aled an inte re sting gap based on fantasy orie ntation: High-FO 4-ye ar-o lds attribute d p ro pe rtie s similarly to 5-ye ar-o lds of both orie ntations on 3 of the 4 pro perty typ es (biolo gic al, soc ial and mental), w he re as lo w -FO 4 year-olds show ed a much low e r leve l of attributions and re se mbled the 3-year-olds. This finding suggests a po ssible advantage of a high FO in making the fantasy/ re ality distinctio n.
Discussion
The most striking finding of this re se arc h w as the co ntrast betw ee n children's re latively inaccurate cate go ry judgments and their re latively adult-like pro p erty attributions. Both 4-to 5-year-old childre n and adults differe ntiate d clearly betw een re al and fantastical entities in their pro perty attributions, altho ugh childre n c orre ctly c ate go rized the fantastical entities only one third of the time . Furthe r, in their cate gory judgments, childre n ofte n assigned the 'unc ertain' cate go ry. This suggests that, rathe r than being ac tively misguide d, young c hildre n are so me time s simply unsure about an e ntity's re ality status. Finally, an intriguing re latio n w as found betw e en a high fantasy orie ntation and more adult-like cate go ry judgments for bo th re al and fantastic al entities.
Category judgments
Consiste nt w ith pre vio us re se arc h (Samuels & Taylor, 1994; Taylor & Ho w ell, 1973) , young children in o ur study freque ntly failed to cate gorize e ntitie s corre ctly in te rms o f their fantasy/ re ality status. Ove rall, they w e re co rre c t less than half the time . Thus, in te rms of assigning entities to the co rre c t cate gory, childre n of all age s in this study performe d po orly. How e ver, tw o additional analyses p oint to a mo re comp le x picture .
Children's use of 'not sure' Pre vio us re se arc h has commonly offere d c hildre n o nly tw o re spo nse o ptions, 're al' and 'pre te nd'. If c hildre n are unc ertain about the status of a fantasy figure , this w ill pro duc e an e rro neous pic ture of c hildren's beliefs, e ither inflating or de flating e stimate s of belief leve ls. Our pro c edure allow e d us to capture childre n's unce rtainty re garding these entities. When 'no t sure ' re spo nse s are taken into ac count, w e find that fo r only a fe w of the entities did the majo rity of c hildren at a given age actively assign the w ro ng status. Thus, w he n given the o pp o rtunity, many childre n ackno w ledge d the ir unce rtainty re garding the re ality status of many entities. This is a very differe nt kind of confusio n than co nfidently holding a belief in the inc orre c t re ality status. A c hild w ho ex p re sses hesitatio n w hen asked w he the r a mo nste r is re al o r pre te nd has not yet achieved an adult unde rsta nding o f the insubstantiality of monste rs, but neithe r is he or she c ommitte d to a belief in their re ality.
Category judgments for individual entities
The entities that pro duce d the most c onsiste nt miscate gorization (e.g. Santa Claus among 4-year-olds, and Santa and the Easte r Bunny amo ng 5-year-olds; see Table 1 ) w ere large ly those fo r w hich p are ntal and soc ial support is most stro ng (Pre ntic e e t a l., 1978; Ro se ngren e t a l., 1994). The ro le o f so cial facto rs w as furthe r re ve aled in the differe nc es in childre n's be liefs ac ro ss the age groups. Of the 11 entities included in the cate go rizatio n task, 8 show ed clear developme ntal tre nds, and 6 o f the se w e re in the 'c orre ct' direc tion (i.e . incre asing cate gorization as re al for the child, c lo w n, knight and dinosaur, and inc re asing c ate gorization as pre te nd fo r the mo nste r and Supe rman). Only tw o entities sho w ed a clear tre nd in the 'inc orre c t' directio n, and these tw o (the Easte r Bunny and Santa Claus) are the fantastical entities that enjo y the mo st pare ntal and so c ial suppo rt (Ro se ngren e t a l. 1994).
This patte rn o f re sponse s unde rsc ore s the imp ortanc e o f the larger so cial co nte x t in the developme nt o f c hildre n's beliefs. The view o f c hildre n as highly cre dulous has o ften failed to ackno w ledge the e x te nt to w hich children are ex p ecte d and enc ourage d to ho ld c ertain fantastic al beliefs (c f. Woo lle y, 1997). It should be no te d that Piaget, w hose w o rk co ntribute d significantly to this view , made a stro ng distinctio n be tw ee n childre n's individual magical belie fs and the magical beliefs o f soc ie ty as a w hole (Piaget, 1930) . Ye t these se emingly parado xic al tre nds-of both inc re asing acc uracy and incre asing erro r-c an be trac ed to childre n's deve lo ping kno w ledge o f and ex p erienc e in the w orld. Childre n learn in the course of a sc hoo l day that dino saurs lived aeo ns ago , but the y also w rite lette rs to Santa fro m these same classro oms. Pare nts and o ther adults imp art factual know le dge, but they also ac tive ly foste r p artic ular fantastic al be lie fs (Clark, 1995) . Thus, both the develo pme nt of belie fs c onsidere d c orre c t (e .g. dino saurs are re al), and the simultane ous develo pme nt o f be liefs co nsidere d inco rre c t, but age-appro priate (e.g. Santa is re al), o riginate in w hat children are taught. Childre n may be mo re w illing to ente rtain fantastic al beliefs than are most adults, but the y are also mo re uniformly e nco uraged to do so . These data thus suggest that it is inc orre ct to view childre n as generically c re dulous (Daw kins, 1995) . The y did not ye t make the same fantasy/ re ality assignme nts as adults, but neither did they fail to differe ntiate at all. Rather, their most common miscate gorizations c oncerned spec ific fantastic al entities that yo ung childre n are gene rally enc ouraged to believe are re al.
Property attributions
In contrast to their c ate gory judgments, childre n's patte rns o f pro p erty attribution w e re similar to those of adults, and re veale d an intriguing develop me ntal p ro gression. Fiveyear-o lds w ere identical to adults in their p atte rn of attributio ns ac ro ss the differe nt typ es o f pro pe rtie s (p hysical, so c ial, etc .). Fo ur-year-olds differe ntiate d be tw e en fantastic al and re al entities in their attributio n o f social and physical pro pe rtie s, w hile failing to differe ntiate significantly betw ee n the tw o in their attribution o f biolo gical and me ntal pro pe rtie s. When p ro pe rty attributions w ere analysed in te rms of the individual child's o w n cate go ries o f re al and pre te nd, 3-ye ar-o lds pe rfo rme d like the o lder childre n, c onsiste ntly attributing mo re human-like so cial pro pertie s to entities they classified as re al co mpare d w ith entitie s they classified as p re te nd.
The develo pme ntal change in c hildren's patte rns o f p ro pe rty attributio ns suggests an importan t ro le for kno w ledge ac quisitio n in the developme nt o f the fantasy/ re ality distinctio n. Childre n discriminate d first betw ee n the pro pertie s o f re al and fantastical entities in the tw o domains in w hic h they are apt to have the most kno w ledge (i.e. the physic al and the social; see, e .g., Fivush, 1997; Spelke, Gute il, & Van de Walle, 1995) . The soc ial domain seeme d esp ecially imp ortant at all ages. Adults grante d soc ial pro pertie s to fantastical entities least o ften. The first sign of differe ntiation amo ng the 3-year-olds in our study w as in the gre ate r number of so cial pro pe rtie s they attribute d to entities the y c onsidere d re al co mpare d w ith tho se they co nsidere d fantastical. Only later did childre n discriminate in the do mains in w hich they are still re lative no vices (i.e. the domains o f biology and mind; se e, e .g., We llman & Ge lman, 1998). This re sult undersc ore s the far-re ac hing effe cts of this fo undational kno w ledge.
Even w ith suc h kno w ledge , childre n face a c onside rable challe nge, as they must still re c ognize w hat imp lic atio ns the p ro pe rty informatio n has for re ality status. Fantastical entities may be partic ularly difficult be cause they have contradicto ry p ro pe rtie s. They ofte n posse ss many attribute s that are basic (e.g. facial feature s) or highly typical (e .g. Santa w ears clothes and has a w ife) of re al e ntitie s. At the same time , the y po ssess attribute s that are no t o nly unusual but also imp ossible fo r re al entities (e .g. Santa also flies in a sle igh). In a study on young c hildre n's understanding o f gender, Ge lman, Collman, and Macc oby (1986) found that childre n w e re notably bette r at c orre ctly inferring pro p ertie s, given a cate go ry label, than the re ve rse . Inferring the co rre c t cate go ry w hen given contradicto ry pro perty informatio n w as espec ially difficult. Ye t this is pre c isely the challenge that fantastic al entities raise. Childre n must come to re c ognize, for ex ample , that an e ntity may po ssess many human-typic al so cial pro pertie s, but even one no n-human biological pro perty is e no ugh to c onsign it to the re alm of fantasy.
The co ntrast betw ee n c hildren's cate go ry judgments and pro perty attributio ns has another develo pme ntal implication. It suggests that many pre sc hoo l-age childre n may have an implicit cate go ry of entities they do not ye t labe l p re te nd, yet to w hich they grant few human-like pro pertie s. This mix ed cate go ry could c onc eivably se rve as a transitional cate go ry as childre n develop the adult fantasy cate gory. As childre n le arn more abo ut the pro pertie s that are nece ssary and typic al of humans, the co ntrast betw een the pro pertie s of the supp osedly re al e ntities and tho se of the truly re al w ill incre ase; this c ould he lp c hildren re co gnize that so me of the entities are no t re al but imaginary.
Effects of fantasy orientation
Our final finding w as that a high FO had a po sitive effec t on c hildre n's c ate gorizatio n of both re al and fantastic al entities: At all age s, high-FO childre n w e re more ac curate than w ere the ir lo w -FO pe ers. This is an ex citing finding, as there is ve ry little info rmatio n in the literature o n the ro le that individual differe nces play in childre n's understanding of the fantasy/re ality distinctio n. One possible e x planatio n is that high-FO c hildre n spend more time e ngaged w ith the fantasy w orld and the re by ac crue more kno w ledge abo ut it, seeing first hand bo th the limits and the p ossibilities o f imagination. It is also p ossible that these childre n's inte re st and engage me nt in fantasy e lic its mo re instruction from pare nts, for ex ample discussion of the differe nces betw ee n re al friends and imaginary ones. More w ork is so re ly nee de d on this issue.
Conclusion
Our re sults suggest the fo llow ing te ntative ske tc h o f the p o ssible c o urse o f deve lo pme nt o f the fantasy/re ality distinctio n: The ve ry yo ung child may initially be some w hat unsure abo ut attributing human-like pro pe rtie s to various e ntitie s. With ex p erienc e, childre n ac quire incre asing kno w ledge about eve rything in their w orldbo th about re al entities and the ir pro pertie s, and about such so cially sup porte d myths as Santa Claus and the Easte r Bunny. Thus, there is the simultaneo us deve lopme nt o f beliefs co nsidere d c orre ct (e.g. dino saurs are re al) and of beliefs c onside re d inco rre c t but age -ap pro p riate (e.g. Santa is re al). But at the same time , as childre n belie ve in the re ality o f fantasy figure s, o r are unable to say w ith ce rtainty that they are pre te nd, they tre at the m very differe ntly fro m re al entities in te rms of the pro pe rtie s and abilities they are w illing to grant. In this w ay, childre n se e m to plac e fantastic al entities in a separate cate go ry-neither unquestionably re al nor pre te nd, but so me w here in be tw ee n. This cate go ry co uld the n form a natural bridge to the adult cate go ry of fantastic al entities. Thus, rathe r than having misplaced the bo undary betw een re al and fantastical entities, yo ung childre n are still in the pro cess o f active ly c onstruc ting it.
